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Author SHA1 Message Date
arvanitakis 2cc6f5e5f0 Bump Version to 0.18.0 2026-09-16 00:06:04 +03:00
arvanitakis 0babc6a96d Fix: Locking User on Login to manage otp attempts 2026-09-16 00:05:53 +03:00
3 changed files with 48 additions and 22 deletions
+11 -1
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@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ All notable changes to this project will be documented in this file.
The format is based on [Keep a Changelog](https://keepachangelog.com/en/1.1.0/).
## [Unreleased]
## [0.18.0] - 2026-09-16
### Added
@@ -37,6 +37,16 @@ call now exist:
client-supplied id alone (verified live: a second customer attempting to read/edit the first's
address or order gets `AddressNotFoundException`/`OrderNotFoundException`, not the record).
### Fixed
- `Modules\Core\Auth\Services\UserOtpService::validate()`'s wrong-guess counter (`otp_attempts`)
was read-check-increment-saved with no locking — two guesses fired in parallel for the same
user could each read the same pre-increment value and both save past `max_attempts`, letting an
attacker exceed the 5-guess lockout by parallelizing requests instead of sending them serially.
Now wrapped in a `DB::transaction()` with `lockForUpdate()` on the user row, so concurrent
guesses serialize correctly against the shared counter.
- The OTP code comparison used a plain `!=` rather than a timing-safe comparison. Now
`hash_equals()`.
## [0.17.5] - 2026-09-15
### Added
+1 -1
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@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
"name": "boboko/core",
"description": "Core module — authentication and shared panel behaviour",
"type": "library",
"version": "0.17.5",
"version": "0.18.0",
"autoload": {
"psr-4": {
"Modules\\Core\\": "src/"
+36 -20
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@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ namespace Modules\Core\Auth\Services;
use Illuminate\Contracts\Auth\Authenticatable;
use Illuminate\Http\Request;
use Illuminate\Support\Facades\Auth;
use Illuminate\Support\Facades\DB;
use Illuminate\Support\Facades\Event;
use Illuminate\Support\Facades\Mail;
use Illuminate\Support\Facades\RateLimiter;
@@ -97,40 +98,55 @@ class UserOtpService
public function validate(string $email, string $code, ?Request $request = null): ?Authenticatable
{
$model = config('auth.providers.users.model');
$user = $model::where('email', $email)->first();
if (! $user || ! $user->otp_expires_at || now()->isAfter($user->otp_expires_at)) {
return null;
}
// lockForUpdate() + a transaction make the read-check-increment-save
// below atomic across concurrent requests for the same user — without
// it, two guesses fired in parallel can each read the same
// pre-increment otp_attempts value and both save past
// max_attempts, letting an attacker exceed the lockout by
// parallelizing requests instead of sending them serially.
$result = DB::transaction(function () use ($model, $email, $code) {
$user = $model::where('email', $email)->lockForUpdate()->first();
if ($user->otp_code != $code) {
$user->otp_attempts++;
if ($user->otp_attempts >= (int) config('core.auth.otp.max_attempts', 5)) {
$user->otp_code = null;
$user->otp_expires_at = null;
$user->otp_attempts = 0;
if (! $user || ! $user->otp_expires_at || now()->isAfter($user->otp_expires_at)) {
return null;
}
if (! hash_equals((string) $user->otp_code, $code)) {
$user->otp_attempts++;
if ($user->otp_attempts >= (int) config('core.auth.otp.max_attempts', 5)) {
$user->otp_code = null;
$user->otp_expires_at = null;
$user->otp_attempts = 0;
}
$user->save();
return null;
}
$user->otp_code = null;
$user->otp_expires_at = null;
$user->otp_attempts = 0;
$user->save();
return $user;
});
if (! $result) {
return null;
}
$user->otp_code = null;
$user->otp_expires_at = null;
$user->otp_attempts = 0;
$user->save();
RateLimiter::clear($this->generationLimiterKey($email));
Auth::login($user);
Auth::login($result);
$this->sessions->record($user, $request);
$this->sessions->record($result, $request);
Event::dispatch(new CustomerLoggedIn($user));
Event::dispatch(new CustomerLoggedIn($result));
return $user;
return $result;
}
private function generationLimiterKey(string $email): string