Feat: Adding hashes for otp codes

database/migrations/2026_09_30_000001_hash_otp_code_on_users_table.php

@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+<?php
+
+use Illuminate\Database\Migrations\Migration;
+use Illuminate\Database\Schema\Blueprint;
+use Illuminate\Support\Facades\Schema;
+
+/**
+ * otp_code was stored in plaintext (a raw 6-digit string) and compared
+ * with hash_equals() against the plaintext guess in
+ * Modules\Core\Auth\Services\UserOtpService — hash_equals() only
+ * prevents a timing attack, it does nothing to protect the code itself
+ * from anyone with read access to the row. Replaced with a bcrypt hash,
+ * same pattern Modules\Core\Customer\Services\CustomerEmailChangeService
+ * already uses for its own pending_email_code_hash column.
+ *
+ * No backfill: any code mid-flight when this deploys is invalidated —
+ * codes expire in 10 minutes anyway, so the real-world impact is a
+ * shopper re-requesting one, not lost work.
+ */
+return new class extends Migration
+{
+    public function up(): void
+    {
+        Schema::table('users', function (Blueprint $table) {
+            $table->string('otp_code_hash')->nullable()->after('password');
+        });
+
+        Schema::table('users', function (Blueprint $table) {
+            $table->dropColumn('otp_code');
+        });
+    }
+
+    public function down(): void
+    {
+        Schema::table('users', function (Blueprint $table) {
+            $table->string('otp_code', 6)->nullable()->after('password');
+        });
+
+        Schema::table('users', function (Blueprint $table) {
+            $table->dropColumn('otp_code_hash');
+        });
+    }
+};

database/migrations/2026_09_30_000002_hash_otp_code_on_lunar_staff_table.php

@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+<?php
+
+use Illuminate\Database\Migrations\Migration;
+use Illuminate\Database\Schema\Blueprint;
+use Illuminate\Support\Facades\Schema;
+
+/**
+ * Same fix as 2026_09_30_000001_hash_otp_code_on_users_table.php, for
+ * staff logins — see that migration's own docblock. This path was
+ * additionally weaker: Modules\Core\Auth\Services\OtpService compared
+ * with a loose != rather than hash_equals(), so it had no timing-attack
+ * protection at all on top of the plaintext storage.
+ */
+return new class extends Migration
+{
+    public function up(): void
+    {
+        Schema::table('lunar_staff', function (Blueprint $table) {
+            $table->string('otp_code_hash')->nullable()->after('password');
+        });
+
+        Schema::table('lunar_staff', function (Blueprint $table) {
+            $table->dropColumn('otp_code');
+        });
+    }
+
+    public function down(): void
+    {
+        Schema::table('lunar_staff', function (Blueprint $table) {
+            $table->string('otp_code', 6)->nullable()->after('password');
+        });
+
+        Schema::table('lunar_staff', function (Blueprint $table) {
+            $table->dropColumn('otp_code_hash');
+        });
+    }
+};

docs/lunar.md

@@ -393,7 +393,7 @@ Because Filament instantiates `Lunar\Admin\Models\Staff` directly (not a subclas
 ```php
 use Lunar\Admin\Models\Staff as LunarStaff;
 
-LunarStaff::addActivitylogExcept(['otp_code', 'otp_expires_at', 'password']);
+LunarStaff::addActivitylogExcept(['otp_code_hash', 'otp_expires_at', 'password']);
 ```
 
 ---

docs/otp-auth.md

@@ -30,11 +30,12 @@ Codes expire after **10 minutes**. After a successful validation the code is cle
 
 ### Database
 
-Two columns on the `lunar_staff` table (added by `2026_05_06_000001_add_otp_to_lunar_staff_table`):
+Two columns on the `lunar_staff` table (added by `2026_05_06_000001_add_otp_to_lunar_staff_table`,
+`otp_code` replaced with a hashed column by `2026_09_30_000002_hash_otp_code_on_lunar_staff_table`):
 
 | Column | Type | Purpose |
 |---|---|---|
-| `otp_code` | string, nullable | The generated code |
+| `otp_code_hash` | string, nullable | Bcrypt hash of the generated code (`'hashed'` cast on `Staff`) |
 | `otp_expires_at` | timestamp, nullable | Expiry time |
 
 ### Login Page

src/Auth/Models/Staff.php

@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ class Staff extends ModelsStaff
         'last_name',
         'admin',
         'email',
-        'otp_code',
+        'otp_code_hash',
         'otp_expires_at',
     ];
 
@@ -19,6 +19,18 @@ class Staff extends ModelsStaff
         'admin' => 'bool',
         'email_verified_at' => 'datetime',
         'password' => 'hashed',
+        'otp_code_hash' => 'hashed',
         'otp_expires_at' => 'datetime',
     ];
+
+    // Overrides (doesn't merge with) Lunar\Admin\Models\Staff's own
+    // $hidden — repeats its password/remember_token here so this class
+    // doesn't silently drop that protection while adding otp_code_hash/
+    // otp_expires_at, which the base model has no reason to know about.
+    protected $hidden = [
+        'password',
+        'remember_token',
+        'otp_code_hash',
+        'otp_expires_at',
+    ];
 }

src/Auth/Services/OtpService.php

@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@
 
 namespace Modules\Core\Auth\Services;
 
+use Illuminate\Support\Facades\Hash;
 use Illuminate\Support\Facades\Mail;
 use Modules\Core\Auth\Mail\OtpMail;
 use Modules\Core\Auth\Models\Staff;
@@ -27,7 +28,10 @@ class OtpService
 
         $code = str_pad((string) random_int(0, 999999), self::CODE_LENGTH, '0', STR_PAD_LEFT);
 
-        $staff->otp_code = $code;
+        // otp_code_hash's 'hashed' cast (see Staff's own $casts) hashes
+        // this automatically on assignment, same as password — never
+        // stored or compared in plaintext.
+        $staff->otp_code_hash = $code;
         $staff->otp_expires_at = now()->addMinutes(self::EXPIRY_MINUTES);
         $staff->save();
 
@@ -44,11 +48,15 @@ class OtpService
             return null;
         }
 
-        if (! $staff->otp_expires_at || $staff->otp_code != $code || now()->isAfter($staff->otp_expires_at)) {
+        if (! $staff->otp_code_hash || ! $staff->otp_expires_at || now()->isAfter($staff->otp_expires_at)) {
             return null;
         }
 
-        $staff->otp_code = null;
+        if (! Hash::check($code, $staff->otp_code_hash)) {
+            return null;
+        }
+
+        $staff->otp_code_hash = null;
         $staff->otp_expires_at = null;
         $staff->save();
 

src/Auth/Services/UserOtpService.php

@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ use Illuminate\Support\Facades\Auth;
 use Illuminate\Support\Facades\Cache;
 use Illuminate\Support\Facades\DB;
 use Illuminate\Support\Facades\Event;
+use Illuminate\Support\Facades\Hash;
 use Illuminate\Support\Facades\Mail;
 use Illuminate\Support\Facades\RateLimiter;
 use Modules\Core\Auth\Events\UserAuthenticated;
@@ -40,8 +41,11 @@ use Modules\Core\Auth\Mail\UserOtpMail;
  * at all — firstOrCreate() and UserCreated only fire from validate(), and
  * only once the code has actually been proven correct. An email that
  * already has a User row is unaffected: its OTP state still lives on that
- * row's own otp_code/otp_expires_at/otp_attempts columns exactly as
+ * row's own otp_code_hash/otp_expires_at/otp_attempts columns exactly as
- * before, so a returning shopper's login is unchanged.
+ * before, so a returning shopper's login is unchanged. otp_code_hash
+ * holds a bcrypt hash of the code (the 'otp_code_hash' => 'hashed' cast
+ * on App\Models\User hashes it automatically on assignment, same as
+ * password), not the code itself — compared via Hash::check().
  *
  * Two independent throttles, both configured under core.auth.otp — see
  * config/core.php's own comment for why they're separate: max_attempts
@@ -87,7 +91,7 @@ class UserOtpService
         $code = str_pad((string) random_int(0, 999999), self::CODE_LENGTH, '0', STR_PAD_LEFT);
 
         if ($user) {
-            $user->otp_code = $code;
+            $user->otp_code_hash = $code;
             $user->otp_expires_at = now()->addMinutes(self::EXPIRY_MINUTES);
             $user->otp_attempts = 0;
             $user->save();
@@ -96,8 +100,12 @@ class UserOtpService
             // class's own docblock for why: creating one on every
             // generateAndSend() call let anyone mint real User/Customer
             // rows for an email nobody proved they owned.
+            //
+            // Hashed even in the cache (not just on the DB-backed path)
+            // — a code sitting in Cache::get()-able storage is the same
+            // exposure as a plaintext DB column if anything can read it.
             Cache::put($this->pendingKey($email), [
-                'code' => $code,
+                'code_hash' => Hash::make($code),
                 'expires_at' => now()->addMinutes(self::EXPIRY_MINUTES)->timestamp,
                 'attempts' => 0,
             ], now()->addMinutes(self::EXPIRY_MINUTES));
@@ -154,15 +162,15 @@ class UserOtpService
         return DB::transaction(function () use ($model, $email, $code) {
             $user = $model::where('email', $email)->lockForUpdate()->first();
 
-            if (! $user || ! $user->otp_expires_at || now()->isAfter($user->otp_expires_at)) {
+            if (! $user || ! $user->otp_code_hash || ! $user->otp_expires_at || now()->isAfter($user->otp_expires_at)) {
                 return null;
             }
 
-            if (! hash_equals((string) $user->otp_code, $code)) {
+            if (! Hash::check($code, $user->otp_code_hash)) {
                 $user->otp_attempts++;
 
                 if ($user->otp_attempts >= (int) config('core.auth.otp.max_attempts', 5)) {
-                    $user->otp_code = null;
+                    $user->otp_code_hash = null;
                     $user->otp_expires_at = null;
                     $user->otp_attempts = 0;
                 }
@@ -172,7 +180,7 @@ class UserOtpService
                 return null;
             }
 
-            $user->otp_code = null;
+            $user->otp_code_hash = null;
             $user->otp_expires_at = null;
             $user->otp_attempts = 0;
             $user->save();
@@ -200,7 +208,7 @@ class UserOtpService
                 return null;
             }
 
-            if (! hash_equals((string) $pending['code'], $code)) {
+            if (! Hash::check($code, $pending['code_hash'])) {
                 $pending['attempts']++;
 
                 if ($pending['attempts'] >= (int) config('core.auth.otp.max_attempts', 5)) {

src/CorePlugin.php

@@ -150,7 +150,7 @@ class CorePlugin implements Plugin
         });
 
         LunarStaff::addActivitylogExcept([
-            'otp_code',
+            'otp_code_hash',
             'otp_expires_at',
             'password',
             'remember_token',

src/Customer/Privacy/CustomerDataProvider.php

@@ -115,7 +115,7 @@ class CustomerDataProvider implements PersonalDataProvider
             // secret tied to an identity that no longer exists here — clear
             // it alongside name/email rather than leaving it to expire on
             // its own 10-minute window.
-            'otp_code' => null,
+            'otp_code_hash' => null,
             'otp_expires_at' => null,
             'otp_attempts' => 0,
         ]);

src/Customer/Services/CustomerEmailChangeService.php

@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ use Modules\Core\Customer\Exceptions\InvalidEmailChangeCodeException;
  * hash of the code, expiry, wrong-guess count) lives on the user's own
  * row (see the migration adding pending_email/pending_email_code_hash/
  * pending_email_expires_at/pending_email_attempts) — the same convention
- * Auth\Services\UserOtpService's otp_code/otp_expires_at/otp_attempts
+ * Auth\Services\UserOtpService's otp_code_hash/otp_expires_at/otp_attempts
  * already use — rather than the session, since a code arrives by email
  * and is often opened on a different device/session than the one that
  * requested it; a session-scoped pending change couldn't be confirmed