Merge branch 'master' into Privacy

src/Auth/Exceptions/OtpThrottledException.php

@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+<?php
+
+namespace Modules\Core\Auth\Exceptions;
+
+use RuntimeException;
+
+/**
+ * Thrown by Modules\Core\Auth\Services\UserOtpService::generateAndSend()
+ * when an email has requested too many codes too quickly — caps both
+ * mail-bombing one inbox and the "just request a fresh code to reset my
+ * guess count" loophole a per-code attempt cap alone doesn't close.
+ */
+class OtpThrottledException extends RuntimeException
+{
+    public function __construct(
+        public readonly int $availableInSeconds,
+    ) {
+        parent::__construct("Too many code requests. Try again in {$availableInSeconds} second(s).");
+    }
+}

src/Auth/Extensions/StaffResourceExtension.php

@@ -2,18 +2,18 @@
 
 namespace Modules\Core\Auth\Extensions;
 
-use Filament\Forms\Form;
+use Filament\Schemas\Schema;
 use Lunar\Admin\Support\Extending\ResourceExtension;
 
 class StaffResourceExtension extends ResourceExtension
 {
-    public function extendForm(Form $form): Form
+    public function extendForm(Schema $form): Schema
     {
         $schema = collect($form->getComponents())
             ->reject(fn ($component) => method_exists($component, 'getName') && $component->getName() == 'password')
             ->values()
             ->all();
 
-        return $form->schema($schema);
+        return $form->components($schema);
     }
 }

src/Auth/Filament/Pages/Login.php

@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ class Login extends SimplePage
 {
     use WithRateLimiting;
 
-    protected static string $view = 'core::auth.filament.pages.login';
+    protected string $view = 'core::auth.filament.pages.login';
 
     public ?string $email = '';
     public ?string $otp = '';
@@ -78,7 +78,7 @@ class Login extends SimplePage
             ]);
         }
 
-        if ($staff instanceof FilamentUser && !$staff->canAccessPanel(Filament::getCurrentPanel())) {
+        if ($staff instanceof FilamentUser && !$staff->canAccessPanel(Filament::getCurrentOrDefaultPanel())) {
             throw ValidationException::withMessages([
                 'email' => 'You do not have access to this panel.',
             ]);

src/Auth/Http/Middleware/EnsureSessionNotRevoked.php

@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
+<?php
+
+namespace Modules\Core\Auth\Http\Middleware;
+
+use Closure;
+use Illuminate\Http\Request;
+use Illuminate\Support\Facades\Auth;
+use Modules\Core\Auth\Services\UserSessionService;
+use Symfony\Component\HttpFoundation\Response;
+
+/**
+ * The enforcement half of the session registry — see
+ * Modules\Core\Auth\Services\UserSessionService's own docblock. Not
+ * auto-registered anywhere (no routes/kernel wiring exist in this
+ * package — see Modules\Core\Customer\Services\CustomerAccountService's
+ * own docblock for why this branch stops at services); a consuming app
+ * adds this to its `web` middleware group (after `auth`) to actually get
+ * "logout everywhere" enforcement.
+ *
+ * A request with no recorded UserSession at all (see
+ * UserSessionService::currentSession()'s own docblock) is let through —
+ * only an EXPLICITLY revoked session is rejected.
+ */
+class EnsureSessionNotRevoked
+{
+    public function __construct(
+        private readonly UserSessionService $sessions,
+    ) {}
+
+    public function handle(Request $request, Closure $next): Response
+    {
+        if (! Auth::check()) {
+            return $next($request);
+        }
+
+        $session = $this->sessions->currentSession();
+
+        if ($session && $session->isRevoked()) {
+            Auth::logout();
+            $request->session()->invalidate();
+            $request->session()->regenerateToken();
+
+            abort(401, 'Your session has been revoked. Please log in again.');
+        }
+
+        $session?->update(['last_used_at' => now()]);
+
+        return $next($request);
+    }
+}

src/Auth/Models/UserSession.php

@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+<?php
+
+namespace Modules\Core\Auth\Models;
+
+use Illuminate\Database\Eloquent\Model;
+use Illuminate\Database\Eloquent\Relations\BelongsTo;
+
+/**
+ * One row per login (see Modules\Core\Auth\Services\UserOtpService::
+ * validate()) — see that table's own migration docblock for why this
+ * exists independent of the actual session-store driver.
+ */
+class UserSession extends Model
+{
+    protected $guarded = [];
+
+    protected $casts = [
+        'last_used_at' => 'datetime',
+        'revoked_at' => 'datetime',
+    ];
+
+    public function user(): BelongsTo
+    {
+        $model = config('auth.providers.users.model');
+
+        return $this->belongsTo($model);
+    }
+
+    public function isRevoked(): bool
+    {
+        return $this->revoked_at !== null;
+    }
+}

src/Auth/Services/UserOtpService.php

@@ -2,18 +2,76 @@
 
 namespace Modules\Core\Auth\Services;
 
+use Illuminate\Contracts\Auth\Authenticatable;
+use Illuminate\Http\Request;
+use Illuminate\Support\Facades\Auth;
+use Illuminate\Support\Facades\DB;
 use Illuminate\Support\Facades\Event;
 use Illuminate\Support\Facades\Mail;
+use Illuminate\Support\Facades\RateLimiter;
 use Modules\Core\Auth\Events\UserAuthenticated;
+use Modules\Core\Auth\Exceptions\OtpThrottledException;
 use Modules\Core\Auth\Mail\UserOtpMail;
 
+/**
+ * The storefront's passwordless login — a shopper supplies only an email
+ * (Shopify-style), gets a 6-digit code, and validate() authenticates the
+ * `web` guard via Auth::login().
+ *
+ * That alone is enough to merge/associate any active guest cart into the
+ * now-known customer — Auth::login() fires Illuminate\Auth\Events\Login,
+ * which Lunar's own Lunar\Listeners\CartSessionAuthListener (registered
+ * unconditionally in LunarServiceProvider::boot(), no opt-in needed)
+ * already listens to, calling CartSession::associate() with
+ * config('lunar.cart.auth_policy') — 'merge' by default, 'override' if a
+ * consumer changes that config. Deliberately no cart-association call
+ * here: doing our own on top would run a SECOND merge attempt with a
+ * hardcoded policy that ignores whatever the consumer configured.
+ *
+ * generateAndSend()'s find-or-create already triggers the full
+ * Customer/User pairing cascade for a genuinely new email — see
+ * Modules\Core\Auth\Events\UserCreated's own docblock and
+ * Modules\Core\Customer\Listeners\CreateCustomerForUser.
+ *
+ * Two independent throttles, both configured under core.auth.otp — see
+ * config/core.php's own comment for why they're separate: max_attempts
+ * caps wrong guesses against ONE code; generation_limit caps how often a
+ * NEW code can be requested for the same email at all (closes both the
+ * "regenerate to reset my guess count" loophole and mail-bombing one
+ * inbox).
+ *
+ * validate() also records a UserSessionService entry for the new login —
+ * see that class's own docblock for the "logout everywhere" registry
+ * this feeds (Modules\Core\Auth\Http\Middleware\EnsureSessionNotRevoked
+ * is the enforcement half; a consuming app must add it to its own
+ * middleware stack). $request is optional purely so this service stays
+ * callable from a context with no HTTP request at all (a console
+ * command, a test) — user-agent/ip are simply not recorded when omitted.
+ */
 class UserOtpService
 {
     private const EXPIRY_MINUTES = 10;
     private const CODE_LENGTH = 6;
 
+    public function __construct(
+        private readonly UserSessionService $sessions,
+    ) {}
+
+    /**
+     * @throws OtpThrottledException if this email has requested too many
+     *   codes within core.auth.otp.generation_decay_minutes
+     */
     public function generateAndSend(string $email): bool
     {
+        $limiterKey = $this->generationLimiterKey($email);
+        $maxGenerations = (int) config('core.auth.otp.generation_limit', 3);
+
+        if (RateLimiter::tooManyAttempts($limiterKey, $maxGenerations)) {
+            throw new OtpThrottledException(RateLimiter::availableIn($limiterKey));
+        }
+
+        RateLimiter::hit($limiterKey, (int) config('core.auth.otp.generation_decay_minutes', 10) * 60);
+
         $model = config('auth.providers.users.model');
         $user = $model::firstOrCreate(['email' => $email]);
 
@@ -21,6 +79,7 @@ class UserOtpService
 
         $user->otp_code = $code;
         $user->otp_expires_at = now()->addMinutes(self::EXPIRY_MINUTES);
+        $user->otp_attempts = 0;
         $user->save();
 
         Mail::to($user->email)->send(new UserOtpMail($user->name ?? $user->email, $code));
@@ -28,25 +87,70 @@ class UserOtpService
         return true;
     }
 
-    public function validate(string $email, string $code)
+    /**
+     * A wrong code counts against core.auth.otp.max_attempts and, once
+     * reached, invalidates the code entirely — the shopper must request
+     * a fresh one via generateAndSend() (itself throttled independently
+     * — see this class's own docblock) rather than being able to keep
+     * guessing against a still-live code for the rest of its 10-minute
+     * expiry window.
+     */
+    public function validate(string $email, string $code, ?Request $request = null): ?Authenticatable
     {
         $model = config('auth.providers.users.model');
-        $user = $model::where('email', $email)->first();
 
-        if (! $user) {
+        // lockForUpdate() + a transaction make the read-check-increment-save
+        // below atomic across concurrent requests for the same user — without
+        // it, two guesses fired in parallel can each read the same
+        // pre-increment otp_attempts value and both save past
+        // max_attempts, letting an attacker exceed the lockout by
+        // parallelizing requests instead of sending them serially.
+        $result = DB::transaction(function () use ($model, $email, $code) {
+            $user = $model::where('email', $email)->lockForUpdate()->first();
+
+            if (! $user || ! $user->otp_expires_at || now()->isAfter($user->otp_expires_at)) {
+                return null;
+            }
+
+            if (! hash_equals((string) $user->otp_code, $code)) {
+                $user->otp_attempts++;
+
+                if ($user->otp_attempts >= (int) config('core.auth.otp.max_attempts', 5)) {
+                    $user->otp_code = null;
+                    $user->otp_expires_at = null;
+                    $user->otp_attempts = 0;
+                }
+
+                $user->save();
+
+                return null;
+            }
+
+            $user->otp_code = null;
+            $user->otp_expires_at = null;
+            $user->otp_attempts = 0;
+            $user->save();
+
+            return $user;
+        });
+
+        if (! $result) {
             return null;
         }
 
-        if (! $user->otp_expires_at || $user->otp_code != $code || now()->isAfter($user->otp_expires_at)) {
-            return null;
-        }
+        RateLimiter::clear($this->generationLimiterKey($email));
 
-        $user->otp_code = null;
-        $user->otp_expires_at = null;
-        $user->save();
+        Auth::login($result);
 
-        Event::dispatch(new UserAuthenticated($user));
+        $this->sessions->record($result, $request);
 
-        return $user;
+        Event::dispatch(new UserAuthenticated($result));
+
+        return $result;
+    }
+
+    private function generationLimiterKey(string $email): string
+    {
+        return 'otp-generate:'.strtolower($email);
     }
 }

src/Auth/Services/UserSessionService.php

@@ -0,0 +1,105 @@
+<?php
+
+namespace Modules\Core\Auth\Services;
+
+use Illuminate\Contracts\Auth\Authenticatable;
+use Illuminate\Http\Request;
+use Illuminate\Support\Str;
+use Modules\Core\Auth\Models\UserSession;
+
+/**
+ * The record/revoke half of the session registry — see
+ * database/migrations/2026_09_15_000001_create_user_sessions_table.php's
+ * own docblock for why this exists (SESSION_DRIVER=redis in this app has
+ * no "sessions" table to purge by user_id). The enforcement half is
+ * Modules\Core\Auth\Http\Middleware\EnsureSessionNotRevoked, which reads
+ * the token this class stamps into the session payload.
+ */
+class UserSessionService
+{
+    private const SESSION_TOKEN_KEY = 'user_session_token';
+
+    /**
+     * Called once, right after Auth::login() succeeds (see
+     * UserOtpService::validate()) — generates a fresh token, records it,
+     * and stamps it into the CURRENT session payload so
+     * EnsureSessionNotRevoked can look it up on later requests.
+     */
+    public function record(Authenticatable $user, ?Request $request = null): UserSession
+    {
+        $token = Str::random(64);
+
+        $session = UserSession::create([
+            'user_id' => $user->getAuthIdentifier(),
+            'token' => $token,
+            'user_agent' => $request?->userAgent(),
+            'ip_address' => $request?->ip(),
+            'last_used_at' => now(),
+        ]);
+
+        session([self::SESSION_TOKEN_KEY => $token]);
+
+        return $session;
+    }
+
+    /**
+     * Revokes every OTHER active session for $user — the current one
+     * (matched by the token in the CURRENT session payload) is left
+     * alone, matching Laravel's own logoutOtherDevices() semantics
+     * (there just isn't a password to re-verify against here — this is a
+     * passwordless account, so revocation is simply "every row that
+     * isn't the one making this request").
+     *
+     * Known, deliberately accepted gap: this requires only a currently
+     * valid session, not a freshly-completed login — so anyone holding
+     * an already-authenticated session (e.g. someone who sits down at an
+     * account left logged in on a shared/public PC) can use this to
+     * evict the real owner's OTHER sessions just as easily as the real
+     * owner could use it to evict an intruder's. A stricter version would
+     * require a fresh OTP re-verification (e.g. within the last few
+     * minutes) before allowing this call. Left as-is for now — revisit if
+     * this turns out to matter in practice, rather than building
+     * abuse-resistance against a threat model nobody's confirmed is real
+     * for this storefront.
+     */
+    public function revokeOtherSessions(Authenticatable $user): int
+    {
+        $currentToken = session(self::SESSION_TOKEN_KEY);
+
+        return UserSession::query()
+            ->where('user_id', $user->getAuthIdentifier())
+            ->whereNull('revoked_at')
+            ->when($currentToken, fn ($query) => $query->where('token', '!=', $currentToken))
+            ->update(['revoked_at' => now()]);
+    }
+
+    /**
+     * Revokes EVERY session for $user, current one included — for a
+     * "this account may be compromised" response, not a routine logout.
+     */
+    public function revokeAllSessions(Authenticatable $user): int
+    {
+        return UserSession::query()
+            ->where('user_id', $user->getAuthIdentifier())
+            ->whereNull('revoked_at')
+            ->update(['revoked_at' => now()]);
+    }
+
+    /**
+     * @return UserSession|null null if the CURRENT session has no
+     *   recorded token at all (e.g. a session predating this feature, or
+     *   one Auth::login() established outside UserOtpService) — treated
+     *   as valid by EnsureSessionNotRevoked rather than rejected, since
+     *   there's nothing to have been revoked.
+     */
+    public function currentSession(): ?UserSession
+    {
+        $token = session(self::SESSION_TOKEN_KEY);
+
+        if (! $token) {
+            return null;
+        }
+
+        return UserSession::where('token', $token)->first();
+    }
+}